Abstract. Accurate estimates of the extent of ethnic parity amongst benefit claimants are very important for policymakers who provide interventions for these groups. We use new administrative data on benefit claimants in Great Britain to document differences in labour market outcomes between Ethnic Minority and White claimants, both before and after controlling for rich observable characteristics. We do so using a variety of methods, from OLS to propensity score matching to difference-in-differences. We find that, in many cases, Minorities and Whites are simply too different for satisfactory estimates to be calculated, and that results are sensitive to the methodology used. This calls into question previous results based on simple regression techniques, which may hide the fact that observationally different ethnic groups are being compared by parametric extrapolation. For Income Support and Incapacity Benefit claimants, however, we could calculate satisfactory results. For these groups, large and significant raw penalties almost always disappear once we appropriately control for pre-inflow characteristics.
Introduction
Significant ethnic differences or lack of ethnic parity in employment rates have existed in Great Britain for several decades (Blackaby et al, 1999; 2002; Cabinet Office, 2003; Heath & Cheung, 2006; Berthoud & Blekesaune, 2006; National Audit Office, 2008) . The National Audit Office (2008) shows that over the last twenty years, the employment gap between Ethnic Minorities and Whites has fluctuated between 12.5 percentage points in 1989 and 20 percentage points in 1994. Since 1994, however, the gap has fallen steadily such that by the third quarter of 2007 it stood at 13.2 percentage points, with 74.8% of the White working-age population in Great Britain in employment compared with 61.6% of the equivalent Ethnic Minority population (Labour Force Survey).
As might be expected, this overall gap conceals considerable diversity in employment rates across ethnic groups (Blackaby et al, 1997; Blackaby et al, 1999; Carmichael & Woods, 2000; Heath & Cheung, 2006; Clark & Drinkwater, 2007; National Audit Office, 2008) . For example, Indian individuals have employment rates that are only slightly lower than those for White individuals, whereas Pakistani and Bangladeshi individuals have employment rates that are considerably lower: in 2007, only 47% of Pakistanis and 44% of Bangladeshis were in employment, compared to around 75% of Whites.
2 There are also important differences in occupations across ethnic groups (Li and Heath, 2008) . To our knowledge, however, there is no evidence available on the extent of ethnic parity in labour market outcomes amongst benefit claimants in Great Britain.
These observed raw differences in labour market outcomes between Ethnic Minorities and Whites suggest that some Ethnic Minority groups may be facing significant obstacles to finding and keeping a job. In 2003, the UK government stated that 'in ten years ' time, Ethnic Minority groups should no longer face disproportionate barriers to accessing and realising opportunities for achievement in the labour market ' (Cabinet Office, 2003) . To achieve such aims, policymakers clearly need to be well-informed about the exact form and extent of any such barriers: in particular, they need to know whether ethnic differences in employment outcomes can be attributed to: a) differences in the characteristics of White and Ethnic Minority groups (which reduce the employability of some ethnic groups relative to Whites); b) some form of discriminatory behaviour in the labour market (either by employers or by Ethnic
Minorities themselves);
2 These figures are largely driven by very low rates of employment amongst women in these groups (of around 26% for Bangladeshis and 28% for Pakistanis) (National Audit Office, 2008).
c) (in the case of benefit claimants) differential effectiveness of public services designed to help individuals return to work.
To be able to identify these effects, it is essential to compare each Ethnic Minority group with an otherwise-identical White group. Of course, it must be acknowledged that if there is differential selection into employment on the basis of unobservables and if there has been discrimination in the labour market in the past, then comparing observationally equivalent Ethnic Minorities and Whites benefit claimants may risk comparing more able Ethnic Minorities with less able Whites, which would lead to an underestimate of any ethnic penalty and an overestimate of any ethnic premium. This issue has been well documented in the literature on ethnic and gender wage gaps (see, for example, Neal & Johnson, 1996) . However, from a policymaker's perspective, it seems important to take some account of observable characteristics when trying to understand the potentially differential effectiveness of public services for White and Ethnic Minority benefit claimants, hence we proceed on this basis, acknowledging that we will not identify the extent of discrimination in the labour market, but will instead provide policymakers with better information than has hitherto been available on the labour market outcomes of benefit claimants in Great
Britain.
Most previous studies that have attempted to take account of potentially endogenous observable characteristics such as labour market history or educational attainment do so by using simple multivariate regression techniques, which rely on being able to observe all characteristics likely to be relevant in determining employment outcomes (e.g. Blackaby et al, 1999; Clark & Drinkwater, 2007) . In this literature, any unexplained (or residual) difference is then attributed to discrimination and the response of Minorities to discrimination (see for example Lindley, 2005) .. However, it is now well known that simple regression techniques may be biased if:
(i) there are 'common support' problems, that is, incomplete overlap in the range of values taken by the observed characteristics for the treatment group (in this case, Ethnic Minorities) and the comparison group (Whites);
(ii) the distribution of characteristics greatly differs between the two groups over the common support, and;
(iii) the effect of the treatment (the ethnic penalty/premium) varies according to observed individual characteristics.
Given the differences in characteristics between Ethnic Minorities and Whites observed in most studies, this is likely to be particularly problematic when trying to identify the impact of ethnicity on any outcome of interest.
To our knowledge no study has examined how sensitive estimates of ethnic penalties or ethnic parity are to the quantitative method of estimation used. In this paper, we borrow heavily from the economic evaluation literature to address this issue. We argue that given our data and questions of interest, the most appropriate technique (that is, the one with the most tenable assumptions) is propensity score matching. Like OLS, it depends on observing all those key determinants of the outcomes of interest that differ between ethnic groups; however, we argue that the detailed labour market histories we are able to construct should substantially reduce biases due to characteristics that we do not observe. Matching also deals with a number of the shortcomings of OLS: it compares only comparable individuals, weighting them correctly and allowing the ethnic penalty to vary across individuals. We compare the results obtained from matching with those derived using three alternative approaches -OLS, fully interacted OLS and difference-in-differences, a method which allows for selection on unobservables under certain assumptions.
The aims of this paper are therefore twofold: 1) to provide evidence on the extent to which there is ethnic parity in labour market outcomes amongst Ethnic Minority and White benefit claimants in Great Britain; 2) to provide evidence on the extent to which previous estimates of ethnic parity may have been biased as a result of relying on simple linear regression techniques.
Using newly released administrative data on benefit claimants in Great Britain 3 , we find that it is often not possible to calculate reliable estimates of the extent of ethnic parity: Minorities and Whites are simply too different in terms of their observable characteristics to be satisfactorily compared. Moreover, in many cases, the different estimation techniques give wildly differing answers, both in terms of sign and of significance of the penalty. This casts doubts on the reliability of previous work that has relied on a single technique without any consideration of how comparable Whites and Ethnic Minorities actually are. Parametric methods such as OLS, or even fully interacted OLS, can easily hide from the analyst the fact that observationally different ethnic groups are de facto being compared on the basis of extrapolations based purely on the imposed functional form.
There are two groups, however, for which we are consistently able to calculate reliable results:
claimants of Incapacity Benefit (IB) and claimants of Income Support (IS). For these groups, we find that controlling for relevant labour market and demographic characteristics eliminates almost all ethnic penalties. In other words, the observed gap in labour market outcomes between
Minorities and Whites' claimants can be entirely explained by differences in characteristics. For these groups, there is also a good degree of consistency across methodologies.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines our methodology; Section 3 describes the data we use; Section 4 describes how we selected our samples; Sections 5 and 6 present our results; Section 7 concludes.
Methodology
The aim of this paper is to determine the extent to which there is ethnic parity in the labour market outcomes of benefit claimants in Great Britain. A natural definition for ethnic parity is when there is no difference, on average, between the outcome for an Ethnic Minority claimant and the outcome for an 'otherwise-identical' White claimant. Where parity does not exist, there will be either an ethnic penalty -if Ethnic Minority customers experience worse outcomes than otherwise-identical White customers -or an ethnic premium -if Ethnic Minority customers experience more favourable outcomes than otherwise-identical White customers. This definition is an ideal one, and our aim is to approximate it empirically.
Since Whites and Ethnic Minorities may differ in terms of characteristics other than ethnicity that affect labour market outcomes, the observed difference in outcomes is likely to provide a biased estimate of ethnic parity. To avoid such a bias, one needs to deal with any differences between ethnic groups in terms of characteristics that may affect their outcomes, such as the individual's family background, education and labour market history.
A number of techniques are available to control for observed differences in characteristics. Within this group of estimators, the technique which is most likely to provide reliable estimates of ethnic parity and which therefore represents the primary approach used in this paper is matching (see e.g. Imbens, 2004 , for an extensive review). Matching re-weights Whites to look as similar as possible to Minorities in terms of observable factors that might affect labour market outcomes. The estimate of the ethnic penalty/parity/premium is then obtained by comparing the mean labour market outcome of the Ethnic Minority group with the mean outcome of the appropriately reweighted White comparison group. To ensure comparability, Ethnic Minority customers for whom no suitable White comparator can be found (i.e. those who fall outside the 'common support') are excluded from the analysis.
Matching is more flexible than most of the alternative techniques available. It also provides a series of diagnostic tests that can be used to analyse how well White and Minority samples have been matched. This is critically important, as when the White sample cannot be re-weighted satisfactorily, it is not clear that any method will provide unbiased estimates of ethnic parity. In this paper, we use a set of criteria to determine when a result should be considered reliable, in the sense that reasonably balanced samples have been achieved. These criteria are heuristic in nature and in line with the spirit of the different diagnostic tests used in the matching literature to ensure that the groups in question have become sufficiently well balanced (see, e.g., Blundell et al, 2005) . The criteria are:
• Given the special importance attached in the literature to the pre-inflow history for the outcome of interest (for example, employment history for an estimate of employment parity) we require that it be successfully balanced at the 5 per cent level.
• We then consider how many of roughly 120 pre-inflow characteristics still significantly differ between Whites and Minorities at the 5 per cent level after matching.
• If a substantial number of these characteristics do remain individually unbalanced, we consider their joint importance in predicting whether an individual is of Ethnic Minority or White origin (this is done in terms of the pseudo-R 2 of a probit on the observables run on the matched samples).
• As a final indicator, we consider the median bias, which gives the median percentage distance between the matched groups in terms of observed characteristics (median across all matching variables).
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Unlike matching, standard regression techniques (OLS) may produce biased estimates of ethnic parity because they:
• may implicitly extrapolate across non-comparable individuals (the common support problem);
• may not weight comparable individuals correctly;
• typically assume that the ethnic penalty is constant across individuals.
Since previous studies estimating ethnic parity have often relied upon simple regression methods, an important contribution of this paper is in assessing the reliability of such techniques by comparing the results they produce with those produced by matching. Of course, some of the restrictions imposed by OLS can be relaxed. In particular, a fully interacted OLS model ('fully interacted linear matching' -FILM) allows the ethnic penalty to vary according to each observable characteristic rather than constraining it to be constant. Indeed, previous research has shown that FILM can often produce estimates that are very similar to those obtained by matching (Blundell et al, 2005) . Nevertheless, the diagnostics provided by matching allow one to investigate the extent to which groups are truly comparable, which may be hidden in both simple and interacted OLS models. We investigate such issues empirically in Section 5.
It should be noted, however, that both matching and regression techniques are only able to control for observed differences between Whites and Minorities, so their reliability crucially depends on the range and quality of observed characteristics. To the extent that unobserved differences are important for explaining labour market outcomes, these will show up in the ethnic parity estimates.
Our choice of sampling frame (see Section 4) and the rich set of characteristics we control for are designed to minimise the extent to which unobservables are important. Previous literature has indicated the potential for detailed labour market histories (like those we construct) to eliminate much of the bias due to unobservables (see for example, , Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998 and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999 ).
An alternative technique, conditional difference-in-differences (DiD), is in principle able to deal both with observed differences in characteristics and with unobserved differences that remain constant over time. This technique involves calculating the average change in outcomes over time for both Whites and Minorities after controlling for observed characteristics, and then taking the difference.
We present some results that use conditional difference-in-differences implemented in a flexible regression framework (FILM) 5 and compare these results with our preferred set of results. The reason for not using DiD as our preferred technique is that entitlement conditions for some of the benefits and programmes we consider require the individual to be in a given labour market status for a certain time prior to inflow, preventing a meaningful application of the technique. 6 An empirical issue with DiD is how best to deal with multiple pre-inflow time periods. Since the literature to date has not provided any established solution, we use either a 12-month moving window to capture seasonal effects or an average over the 12-month period before inflow. We present results using the former approach, but it turns out to make little difference to the results.
As discussed above, one important caveat of our study relates to previous (i.e. pre-inflow) discrimination. If there is differential selection into employment on the basis of unobservables and if there has been discrimination in the labour market in the past, then members of an Ethnic Minority group with the same employment history as their matched White counterparts might represent a higher 'slice' of the (unobserved) ability distribution amongst their ethnic group. As a result, any investigation risks comparing more able Ethnic Minorities with less able Whites, which would lead to an underestimate of any ethnic penalty and to an overestimate of any ethnic premium. A similar argument can be made in terms of other observables one would like to control for, such as education. If the selection process into education differs between Ethnic Minorities and Whites, then comparing Ethnic Minority and White individuals with the same level of education might still leave some unobservable differences unaccounted for. 7 As already stated, however, because we are primarily interested in better understanding differences between the labour market outcomes of Ethnic Minority and White individuals following a spell on benefits and a consequent intervention by the state -and not on the role of labour market discrimination per se -we feel that our approach is justified.
Data
Our strategy for estimating ethnic parity requires that we have information about labour market outcomes and that we control for all pre-inflow characteristics likely to affect these outcomes and to differ between ethnic groups. The key variables we control for across all benefits and programmes are:
• Age
• Gender • Housing tenure (proxy)
• Travel-to-work-area unemployment rate
We also control for a number of variables that are only available or relevant for a subset of the benefits and programmes. These include presence of a partner, number of children, and whether the individual has a disability or illness.
Our main data source is the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS), an administrative dataset of benefit and employment spells for all individuals who have been on a Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) programme or benefit since June 1999. Our analysis thus covers individuals who are unemployed, unable to work due to disability or those on very low incomes (see Section 4 for more details). The extract of the data that we use contains spells up to early
2005. Because the WPLS data is an administrative source, it contains the entire populations we are interested in. Compared to survey data, we thus avoid problems with sample attrition, are able to use much more detailed ethnic breakdowns and provide estimates with higher precision.
We used the WPLS to construct labour market outcomes and histories. We consider two labour market outcomes, both assessed month-by-month: the probability of being in employment (E) and the probability of being on benefits (B). 8 In any one month (30-day period), individuals are defined as being employed (on benefits) if they are employed (on benefit) for at least half of the month.
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Defining outcomes in this way explicitly takes account of the sustainability of any benefit exit or job entry and is therefore preferable to a measure that only considers first destination. Both benefit and employment outcomes are analysed to capture the extent to which individuals who are not employed remain on benefits and the extent to which individuals who are employed still collect benefits (in particular, Income Support). Individuals are followed and their outcomes measured for 12 months following inflow.
We constructed three years' worth of labour market history, including month-by-month employment and benefit status for the six months prior to inflow, as well as variables describing the proportion of time employed and the proportion spent on benefits over the two-and-a-half years prior to that.
We also used the WPLS to create indicators of past participation in voluntary employment programmes (as a crude indicator of willingness to improve one's circumstances) and past participation in Basic Skills (a programme designed to address basic literacy, numeracy and IT skills).
The WPLS also contains a limited number of background characteristics: ethnicity, date of birth, gender and postcode (that we used to identify Jobcentre Plus district and residence in one of a group of 272 deprived wards).
Information from the WPLS was supplemented with information from other administrative sources, namely the National Benefits Database (NBD) and New Deal administrative datasets. The information available varies across benefits and programmes, but includes number of children, presence of a partner, and indicators of disability or illness. None of these sources contained reliable information on education or wealth. Since both are likely to be important determinants of labour market outcomes, we created proxies using local-area data from the 2001 Census. 10 We also used the Census to provide information about local labour market conditions (specifically, travel-to-work area unemployment rates).
Before moving on to describe our sample definitions, there are some limitations of the WPLS that we must note. First, there is no record of how long individuals have been living in the UK. In comparing Ethnic Minorities and Whites, immigration may be an issue. An individual who has just arrived in the UK and starts claiming benefits or joins a programme will never previously have appeared in the WPLS (i.e. they will be recorded as never having previously been employed or on benefit), whereas they may, in reality, have been employed or on benefit in another country.
We have tried to minimise the problems this causes by using the time that each individual has been observed in the WPLS as the reference for calculating pre-inflow labour market histories and by controlling for whether labour market status is known or unknown. A related problem is that recent migrants to the UK may not speak English very well and are therefore likely to find it much harder to get a job than natives. At the same time, finding appropriate White comparators for them is likely to be difficult. Where possible, information on basic skills (including language) needs was used to remove such individuals from the analysis; the fraction affected was small.
A second limitation of the WPLS is that employment spells for individuals on low earnings may be missing. This is because the data are derived from employer income tax returns which are only compulsory for employees earning enough to be subject to income tax. Although some employers submit returns for all employees regardless of their earnings, this is not always the case.
Therefore, individuals earning below the income tax threshold may appear to be unemployed when, in fact, they do have a job. This is problematic if it differs by ethnicity -which it might do if, say, Ethnic Minorities are more likely to work for small employers who are less likely to submit forms for employees below the income tax threshold. There is no way of telling how quantitatively important this issue may be.
Groups of interest and sampling frame
We consider six main benefits and programmes:
• Incapacity benefit (IB): paid to individuals who are assessed as being incapable of work and who meet certain National Insurance contributions conditions.
• Income support (IS): a benefit for individuals on low income; claimants are usually lone parents, sick or disabled, or carers.
• Jobseeker's allowance (JSA): a benefit paid to individuals of working age who are unemployed, or who work fewer than 16 hours per week and are looking for full-time work.
• New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP): a voluntary programme whose aim is to encourage lone parents to improve their work prospects and help them into work.
• New Deal for individuals aged 25 plus (ND25plus): a programme to help unemployed individuals aged 25 and over to find and keep a job. Participation is compulsory for individuals who have been claiming JSA for at least 18 of the previous 21 months.
• New Deal for Young People (NDYP): similar to ND25plus except that it is targeted on individuals aged 18-24. Participation is compulsory for those who have been claiming JSA for at least six months.
Individuals in receipt of these benefits or on these programmes are collectively advised by a publicly funded agency designed to help them back into work, known as "Jobcentre Plus". We thus also present results for "Jobcentre Plus overall", which combines individuals on these six benefits and programmes, together with a number of smaller programmes -New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP), New Deal for Musicians (NDfM), Basic Skills, Work-Based Learning for Adults (WBLA), Employment Zones (Ezones) and Ethnic Minority Outreach 11 -to give an overall estimate of the extent of ethnic parity in the benefit system.
For each of these groups, the sampling frame was all individuals who Alongside the raw differences, the table sets out estimates of ethnic parity constructed using four alternative methodologies -simple OLS, FILM (which allows the penalty to vary with observed characteristics), kernel matching (our preferred technique) and conditional difference-in-differences (implemented in a flexible regression framework and taking the difference for any given outcome month relative to 12 months previously). All results are for 12 months after inflow (i.e. the end of our outcome window).
The Matching Quality column gives matching diagnostics, providing an indication of how successful re-weighting has been in making Whites look like Minorities across all observed dimensions. CS(x) indicates that x per cent of the Minority sample had to be dropped because it was not possible to find comparable Whites with whom they could be matched (i.e. it indicates the extent of the common support problem). UC(y) means that y covariates remained unbalanced after matching. UH(E,B) indicates that employment and benefit histories remain unbalanced after matching. R2(r) is the pseudo-r 2 from a probit (on matched samples) of Ethnic Minority group on the observables and MB(s) gives the median percentage distance between the matched groups in terms of observed characteristics. There are two key points to take from this (Blundell et al, 2005) .
These findings raise important questions over the reliability of previous regression-based estimates of ethnic parity. When matching cannot construct a suitable comparison group, it seems unlikely that any of the other techniques we employ will provide unbiased estimates. Since matching avoids a number of biases associated with OLS, this serves as a warning against relying on simple regression techniques to estimate the extent of ethnic parity in labour market outcomes. Earlier work that fails to directly address the issue of actual comparability of ethnic groups may therefore be misleading.
IB and IS results
As Table 1 shows, not all results were deemed unreliable. In particular, there are satisfactory results for IB and IS. In this section, we present more detailed results for these two groups, including breakdowns by sex and ethnic group (see Crawford et al, 2008 , for detailed results for the other benefits and programmes in Table 1 ).
First, however, it is worth taking a step back and considering the characteristics of the two samples. Whites and Minorities in the two samples differ considerably in terms of a number of characteristics that are likely to be important for labour market outcomes. For our sample of IB claimants, Table 3 shows mean values for some key characteristics. Ethnic Minorities are on average younger than Whites and have more children; they are more likely to have exhibited a basic skills need and participated in a voluntary programme in the three years prior to inflow, to be claiming Income Support at WFI date (used as a proxy for low income) and to live in higher unemployment areas. In terms of labour market histories, Ethnic Minorities have, on average, spent a smaller proportion of the three years prior to inflow in employment and a larger proportion on benefits than Whites.
There is also considerable variation within the Ethnic Minority sample. For example, Blacks on average spent a larger proportion of the three years prior to WFI date on benefits than Asians. Table 3 Table 4 presents the same figures for our sample of IS claimants. Ethnic Minorities as a whole are more likely than Whites to be female, older, married/cohabiting and disabled; they tend to have more children and live in higher unemployment areas. On average, they have also spent a smaller proportion of the three years prior to inflow in employment and a larger proportion on benefits. Like the IB sample, there is significant variation within the Ethnic Minority sample. For example, Asians were, on average, employed for a considerably smaller proportion of the three years prior to inflow than Blacks.
These tables illustrate clearly that in order to be confident of any estimates of the extent of ethnic parity between Minorities and Whites, we must adequately account for differences in composition.
They also suggest it may be important to consider different ethnic groups separately.
Overall IS and IB results
Figures 1 and 2 show raw employment and benefit status over time for our IB and IS samples respectively. Months are measured along the horizontal axis, from six months prior to inflow to 12 months after (months -5 to 12). Inflow is indicated by the vertical line between months 0 and 1. The vertical axis is the proportion of individuals employed or on benefit. For both IB and IS, Whites are more likely to be employed and less likely to be on benefits at all points in time, but the gap narrows around the time of inflow and tends to be smaller for IS than IB. As expected, the proportion of individuals employed rises over time after inflow and the proportion on benefit falls, but the fall in receipt of benefit is faster than the rise in employment. Around 20 per cent of individuals appear to be employed at inflow.
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13 There are a number of possible explanations for this. First, although individuals claiming IB should be incapable of work, this does not mean that they are not employed: for example, it may be the case that they are in a period of temporary absence from their job, but were not entitled to Statutory Sick Pay (and hence have started claiming IB). A second possible explanation relates to the fact that the figure refers not to the day of interview itself, but to employment over the next 30 days. It is therefore possible that nobody was working on the actual day of interview, but did work for at least 15 of the next 30 days. Other work using the WPLS, however, suggests that this does not fully explain the difference (see, for example, Brewer et al, 2008) . Thirdly, it may reflect uncertainties over start and end dates in the employment data, or fraudulent benefit claims. It is not possible to quantify the relative importance of each of these explanations.
Figure 1 IB: raw labour market status over time
Notes: 1. The x-axis shows the six months before entry into the programme (x=-5 to 0) and the 12 months after (x=1 to 12). 2. The y-axis shows the proportion of the sample employed or on benefit.
Figure 2 IS: raw labour market status over time
Notes: see notes to Figure 1 Figures 3 to 6 show the raw and matched results for the employment and benefit outcomes of IS and IB claimants overall, all of which do reasonably well on our heuristic reliability criteria described in Section 2. As before, months are along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis measures the percentage point difference between Minorities and Whites in the proportion employed/on benefit. 14 A positive difference for employment (benefit) is described as an ethnic premium (penalty) and a negative difference as an ethnic penalty (premium). Large and small circles indicate that the difference is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 per cent level respectively.
14 So, for example, the left-hand panel in Figure 3 shows the difference between the two lines in the left-hand panel of Figure 1 .
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The six months prior to inflow are included in the graphs to give an indication of matching quality: if
Whites have been successfully rebalanced to look like Minorities, then the estimates will lie on the horizontal line at zero and there will be no circles indicating statistical significance. Obviously, this
is not sufficient to meet all of the above reliability criteria, which also depend on how well all characteristics (not just previous employment and benefit history) have been balanced (Tables 5   and 6 below provide all the necessary details).
In all four cases, there is a large difference between raw and re-weighted outcomes. For IB, what was roughly a 7 percentage point employment penalty 12 months after inflow is completely eliminated by matching, so that ethnic parity cannot be rejected once observed characteristics have been taken into account. The IB benefit penalty is eliminated for all but a few months in the middle of the year and, at around 1 percentage point, these penalties are considerably smaller than the raw differences. For IS, raw employment and benefit penalties become premia of 2 percentage points by the end of the 12-month outcome window, meaning that Minorities were significantly more likely to be in work and significantly less likely to be claiming benefits than comparable Whites.
Figure 3 IB: ethnic parity in employment outcomes
Notes: 1. The x-axis shows the six months before entry into the programme (x=-5 to 0) and the 12 months after (x=1 to 12). 2. The y-axis shows the difference between Ethnic Minorities and Whites in the proportion employed or on benefit.
3. The vertical line shows the time that individuals start claiming the benefit. 4. Two stars (**) and one star (*), and large and small circles, indicate that the difference is statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per cent levels respectively.
Figure 4 IB: ethnic parity in benefit outcomes
Notes: see notes to Figure 3 
Results by ethnic group
For comparative purposes, the top lines of Tables 5 and 6 set out the overall results, with the remainder of the Table providing estimates for different ethnic groups, further broken down by gender (note that the ethnic subgroups are not all mutually exclusive). Due to insufficient sample sizes, analyses have not been performed for all subgroups (half of the ethnicity-sex combinations for IB and just under a third for IS contained fewer than the required 400 Minorities). As in Table 1 Matching away observable differences between Minorities and Whites again eliminates almost all the penalties, for both employment and benefit outcomes. Black Caribbeans are the only exception, with around a 4.5 percentage point benefit penalty both overall and among the male subgroup. It is interesting to note, however, that these were the groups who displayed the largest differences in raw benefit collection rates (15.2 and 16.6 per cent respectively); contrasting them to comparable White claimants has thus decreased the observed penalty by well over two thirds. On the other hand, two groups experience significant employment premia: males overall and Indian males. This suggests that Ethnic Minority males (Indian males) are 1.9 percentage points (6.7
percentage points) more likely to be in work than comparable White males 12 months after inflow.
Results are similar for IS, though less uniform. The raw employment penalties observed for the overall group of claimants are driven by the Asian groups and, to a lesser extent, the Mixed, Chinese and Other groups. Indeed, Black groups display either no raw employment penalties (males) or a premium (females). The overall premia of 4.1 percentage points for Blacks, 5.9
percentage points for Black Caribbeans and 2.6 percentage points for Black Africans are in fact driven by the corresponding female subgroups. As was the case with IB, raw employment outcomes tend to be worse for men than for women amongst Black groups, while the reverse is true for other ethnic groups. Notes: see notes to Table 5 In terms of benefit receipt, there are raw penalties for Black and Mixed, Chinese and Other groups.
For Asians, there are no raw penalties and a few raw premia (i.e. the raw results suggest that IS claimants of Asian ethnic origin are less likely to be employed but also less likely to be on benefits than White claimants).
Comparing Ethnic Minority claimants with comparable Whites eliminates all the raw penaltiesboth in terms of benefit and employment outcomes -and reveals premia for some groups. In terms of employment, for example, there is a premium of 5.9 percentage points for Blacks overall and of 5.4 percentage points for Black Caribbeans overall (almost three times larger than the 2.1
percentage point premium across all ethnic groups). In terms of benefit receipt, the premia are concentrated among Asian groups: Asians overall are 5.5 percentage points less likely to be claiming benefits than comparable Whites 12 months after inflow, while Indians overall are 6.0 percentage points less likely to be claiming benefits.
In short, the results for IB and IS indicate that differences in characteristics explain almost all of the observed raw employment and benefit penalties, such that most ethnic groups are found to be at least as likely to be in work and off benefits 12 months after inflow as comparable White benefit
claimants. This finding is in marked contrast to previous studies which have sought to estimate the ethnic (un)employment gap, in which significant penalties have been found, even after controlling for a range of observable characteristics. Of course, this may be because we are focusing on benefit recipients rather than considering the whole working age population.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have used novel administrative data to provide a comprehensive picture of the labour market outcomes of Ethnic Minority and White benefit recipients in Great Britain. In general,
there are large and significant raw differences, with Ethnic Minorities 8.9 percentage points less likely to be in work and 5.9 percentage points more likely to be on benefit than Whites 12 months after starting a benefit claim.
From a policy perspective, it is important to know whether this gap is due to: a) differences in the characteristics of Ethnic Minority and White groups; or b) some form of discriminatory behaviour in the labour market (either by employers or by Ethnic Minorities themselves, who may, for example, choose not to apply for a job because they believe -rightly or wrongly -that they will be discriminated against), or differential effectiveness of services designed to help individuals return to work.
While previous work in this area has tended to use simple regression methods to estimate these effects, we consider a range of different techniques, of which our preferred method is kernel-based propensity score matching. We carried out our analysis on the claimants of three benefits (IS, IB and JSA) and the participants of three programmes (NDLP, NDYP and ND25plus). However, satisfactory results -that is based on an appropriate comparison group -could be calculated only for claimants of Incapacity Benefit and Income Support. For these two groups we found that large and significant raw penalties disappeared once we controlled for background and labour market characteristics. In other words, the gap in labour market outcomes following a spell on benefits can be entirely explained by differences in pre-programme characteristics and local labour market conditions. Black Caribbeans on IB are the only group for which penalties, though largely reduced in size, persist after matching. For males and females together, the penalty is 4.6 percentage points. For IS, premia are more widespread, being found for Ethnic Minorities overall, as well as for the employment outcomes of Black claimants and the benefit outcomes of Asian claimants.
One important caveat worth reiterating is that in the presence of past labour market discrimination against Ethnic Minorities coupled with differential selection into employment based on unobservables, members of an Ethnic Minority benefit group with the same employment history as their matched White counterparts are likely to be of higher average unobserved ability. This would lead to an underestimate of any ethnic penalty and to an overestimate of any ethnic premium.
Moreover, the analysis in this paper does not allow one to disentangle which of the various potential channels (described above) lead Ethnic Minority benefit claimants to experience different outcomes from observationally similar Whites. These effects are conflated in our estimates of ethnic parity.
The most important conclusion of this paper, however, is that for many groups it is simply not possible to calculate reliable quantitative estimates of the extent of ethnic parity in labour market outcomes for benefit claimants using existing administrative data combined with local neighbourhood information. Whites and Minorities accessing Jobcentre Plus programmes and services are often too different in terms of pre-programme characteristics for this question to be answered. This will pose a problem regardless of the estimation method used: indeed, our analysis has shown that, for some programmes, the estimates of ethnic parity differ in sign and significance depending on the quantitative approach taken. These issues raise serious questions about the reliability of previous work that has used simple regression methods without carefully considering whether the assumptions required to produce unbiased estimates have been satisfied.
